GHQ AUXILIARY UNITS
KEY QUOTES ON THEIR FORMATION
Many misconceptions have arisen over the origin and role of the GHQ Auxiliary Units through uncritical repetition of material from earlier works. Often, these did not include reference to source material and their conclusions could not be tested. Objective history has now been replaced by a romantic, now deep-seated, myth. The following are a selection of pertinent quotes from those men concerned with the initial foundation of the Auxiliary Units, and from modern historians. See also Citizen Army for a summary of evidence for the military status of both Home Guard and Auxiliary Units.
The reasoned conclusion is that the Auxiliary Units were not intended as a long-term national resistance to operate after occupation (the task of SIS) but rather as a short term military commando expedient around the coast, to assist regular forces during the anti-invasion campaign. Thus, for CO, Colin Gubbins they were 'a bonus, that's all' and for his GSO2, Peter Wilkinson they were not expected to survive 'the first few days of invasion'.
Laurence Grand, head of Section D, SIS
'as far as civilian obstruction was concerned, the organisation on which D officers had been forming was no longer necessary, and its place could now be taken by Auxiliary Units working openly and using as recruits uniformed LDVs'.
Section D Report VIII, July 1940: TNA HS 8/214. quoted in Atkin, Malcolm (2017), Section D for Destruction: forerunner of SOE
Nigel Oxenden, Intelligence Officer and Training Officer, Auxiliary Units
'..most officers were assisted by introductions to one or two men who had already been chosen by MI5 [sic - actually SIS, Section D] ... These were generally outstanding individuals, who eventually became group commanders. Meanwhile their local knowledge made them invaluable in finding the right recruits.' (Nigel Oxenden, Auxiliary Units History and Achievement 1940-44, p.2.