One of the problems of modern historical research is that old, out of date, texts still circulate across the internet. A case in point is that, as of  May 2025,  a  Historic England blog states the SOE established secret Auxiliary Units.  This is clearly incorrect as the Auxiliary Units pre-date the formation of SOE (Special Operations Executive).  The CART website  seeks an equivalence with SOE, claiming  'Essentially SOE contained the overseas elements and Auxiliary Units the elements covering Great Britain, with a few exceptions'.  Another website maintains: 'In its early days SOE also served as the core of the Auxiliary Units, a British resistance movement which would act in case of a German invasion'.Such statements seek to link the Auxiliary Units to a powerful marketing image but what was the real connection?

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The  Auxiliary Units had been formed as a military response to the efforts of Section D of SIS (Secret Intelligence Service aka MI6)  in creating the civilian Home Defence Scheme in Britain.  Hugh Dalton of the Ministry of Economic Warfare had the opposite perspective and believed that military organisations were incapable of organising irregular warfare. He therefore sought to absorb Section D, along with the War Office MI(R) and the propaganda organisation Electra House, to create SOE as a new organisation outside the military establishment. The War Office swiftly moved many elements of MI(R) into other departments where Dalton could not touch them and this included maintaining a firm hold of the Auxiliary Units. This was  as part of the official principle  that any combat on British soil would be conducted on a military basis and not by civilians (with the government turning a blind eye to the unavowable, and highly secret,  schemes of SIS for a civilian resistance in case of enemy occupation that had been created outside of Section D).  The overall rationale of the Auxiliary Units and SOE was therefore completely different. 

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The British perspective on continental resistance tends to focus on the contribution of SOE but it should be remembered that their primary role was in providing support to native resistance groups while trying to ensure that the latter followed a wider strategic plan . In this respect, there is a link of SOE to the  iinitial concept of the Auxiliary Units in June/July 1940 when the intention was that the Auxiliary Units Intelligence officers would merely provide advice to units created by the local Home Guard.  But this idea did not last long and in August the 'classic' 8-man sabotage teams recruited from the Home Guard  were established in coastal areas.  It may be noted that the Auxiliary Units was never a nationwide organisation  (as the quote  from CART  above implies) but was largely confined to a coastal strip so as to egage any initial enemy landings. 

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By November 1940, with the invasion season over and the strength of conventional forces greatly improved, there were already suggestions that the Auxuliary Units had served their purpose and should be disbanded.  This was resisted but senior officers  of the Auxiliary Units now began a drift into SOE as a now more worthwhile vehicle to pursue ideas of less orthodox warfare.  The Auxiliary Units consequently provided a 'nursery' for future champions of irregular warfare. Remarkably, the first  transfers included the  existing CO, Colin Gubbins (later to head SOE) and his GSO2 in charge of organisation and Planning (Peter Wilkinson). Allowing the removal of such key figures is a clear signal that, with the strengthening of conventional forces,  the Auxiliary Units were no longer seen as a priority.  Another early departure was Peter Fleming, who had masterminded the development of the proto--Auxiliary Units as the XII Corps Observation Unit. John Todd, Intelligence Officer for South Wales and Midlands left in 1941 to command SOE operations in East Africa and took his secretary with him. Another Intelligence Officer who transferred was Anthony Quayle, as a rsult  of a mutual distain  for the new CO, Lord Glanusk, who took up his post in 1942.. 

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The main source of supply to the early Auxiliary Units was the Section D supply and research base at Aston Hall. This was taken over by SOE upon its absorption of Section D and it continued to supply the Auxiliary Units with material (as it did to commandos and other special forces). Some of this material may have been on an unofficial basis, such a a number of underwater  limpet mines reputed to have been supplied to some Kent and Cornwall patrols (not to be confused with the Section D/SOE magnets to make improvised limpet bombs for land use).  But from 1942, as the rationale of the Auxiliary Units was increasingly questioned, it is noticable that they did not necessarily receive the latest SOE inventions.  Most noticably they did not receive the silenced Sten gun, as developed by SOE and RSAF.  In his draft official history produced as the Auxiliary Units were disbanding in 1940, Nigel Oxenden expresses a hope that any future iteration of the Auxiliary Units might have the new silenced Welrod but there is no evidence that this was actually issued.  Particular confusion has arisen over the suggestion that the Auxiliary Units received a .22 sniper rifle as supposedly issued to SOE.  This myth is discussed n detail HERE. ​​

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